

“*Gemini Imperatores*”? The Dynamics of Imperial Co-Operation in the Valentinianic Dynasty

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One of the distinctive features of the later Roman Empire was its collegial system of rule, with the empire being divided up amongst two or more different emperors. Although such divisions were not considered to prejudice the *de jure* unity of the empire, in practice relations between imperial colleagues varied, from the close co-operation of the Tetrarchy or the latter years of Constantine to the open hostility of Honorius and Arcadius. The reign of the brothers Valens and Valentinian was one of the more successful such partnerships; certainly imperial propaganda would have us believe so, and panegyrists of the time often emphasised the unity and co-operation which prevailed between the two emperors. It need hardly be pointed out, however, that such propaganda can scarcely be taken at face value, and we will therefore examine both the ways in which contemporary propagandists portrayed the two emperors and the surviving evidence for their government, in order to ascertain how accurate the propagandists' portrayal of this period really was.

Ammianus' account suggests that public, or at least military, opinion of the 360s had come to view the collegial monarchy as necessary for the empire's well-being, the recent deaths of Julian and Jovian having shown just how easy it was for an emperor to die and leave the empire rudderless. After Valentinian was proclaimed emperor in February 364, then, his soldiers immediately began pressuring him to appoint a colleague.¹ Such an action would certainly mitigate the risk of a succession crisis, but could also lead to the possibility of conflict between the two rulers. This may be why Valentinian's choice fell on his younger brother, Valens: as a close relative, Valens would hopefully prove trustworthy, and since he was younger and had a less distinguished military career to point to, he would be easy for Valentinian to influence, if not dominate outright.² Moreover, passing over such a close relative would likely have proved controversial, and Valens could easily become a rallying-point for opponents of the new régime. Valentinian's choice of colleague, then, indicates a recognition of the need for unity amongst the emperors, and we would naturally expect this recognition to manifest itself in the ways he and brother interacted with each other and presented themselves to their subjects.

Looking at the ways in which the new emperors were portrayed in official propaganda, it appears this precisely what we find, and the theme of harmony was strongly emphasised from the beginning of Valentinian's reign. The emperor's first speech to the troops had reiterated his desire for concord,³ and official panegyrics eagerly took up the theme. Symmachus, for example, in a quinquennial oration delivered to the Emperor Valens, dwelt at length on the unity and equality enjoyed by the two emperors, contrasting them favourably with the moon

¹ Amm. 26.2.4; cf. Zos. 4.1.1.

² Noel Lenski, *Failure of Empire: Valens and the Roman State in the Fourth Century A.D.* (Berkeley, 2002), pp. 23 f.

³ Amm. 26.2.8.

and sun, of which the one depended on the other for its light.⁴ Libanius frequently refers to “the brothers” in the dual (τοῖν ἀδελφοῖν),⁵ emphasising their unity, and a similarly close relationship is implied in Symmachus’ use of the terms *germani* (“the brothers”) or even *gemi* (“the twins”).⁶ The most extreme manifestation of this tendency is probably to be found in Themistius’ oration *The Loving Brothers, or, On Brotherly Love* (Φιλᾶδελφοὶ ἢ Περί Φιλανθρωπίας), the name of which gives a good indication of its contents. Themistius portrays Valens as almost a carbon copy of his elder brother: “by taking the purple, you [Valens] have given him [Valentinian] another soul, you have given him another body and the ability to see and hear more, to address peoples widely dispersed and to give judgement simultaneously to Syrians and to Britons.”⁷

This emphasis on unity was, however, tempered by a recognition of Valentinian’s superiority, a superiority which was both moral—since Valens owed his elevation to his brother—and material—since Valens exercised control only over the eastern third of the empire, the remainder being in Valentinian’s hands.⁸ A good example of this is found in Ausonius’ *Versus Paschales*. Writing after Valentinian’s son Gratian was raised to the purple in 367, Ausonius compares the three emperors to the Holy Trinity, but in a distinctly Arian way which leaves no doubt as to Valentinian’s superiority:

The same image is seen here on earth:
The emperor, the father, begets twin emperors,
And in his pious majesty embraces both brother and son,
Sharing one realm among them, but not dividing it;
He alone possesses all, he alone has given all away.⁹

Similar sentiments are found in the panegyrists. Themistius’ speech *On Brotherly Love* has already been quoted for its emphasis on the unity of the emperors, but even here we may note that Valens is said to have given Valentinian “another soul... another body and the ability to see and hear more”: in other words, Valens is acting as a stand-in for his brother, and his actions are an extension of his brother’s rule. Similarly, Libanius, albeit in speeches written after both brothers were dead, refers to Valentinian and Valens as the senior and junior emperors, respectively.¹⁰ Later historians, too, seem to have followed this assessment: Ammianus, for example, describes Valens as “a lawful sharer in power, but in the obedient manner of a secretary,” and as “joined with [his brother] in office, but only in appearance,” whilst as late as the sixth century Jordanes calls Valens “the brother of Valentinian, the senior emperor”.¹¹

A similar message is seen in imperial statuary. Thirty-eight statues depicting either Valentinian or Valens are known from archaeological or literary sources. Thirty-three of these are from the west, of which just over half—seventeen—are of Valentinian alone; a further nine

⁴ Sym. Or. 1, esp. 1.11-13.

⁵ Lib. Or. 19.15, 24.10, 30.7.

⁶ Sym. Or. 1.11, 22; 2.31.

⁷ Them. Or. 6.75c. All translations are the author’s own unless otherwise noted.

⁸ Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 26.

⁹ Aus. Vers. Pasch. 24-8.

¹⁰ Lib. Or. 1.145, 19.15, 20.25, 24.13.

¹¹ Amm. 26.4.3, 5.1; Jord. Get. 25.131.

are of Valens, four depict both emperors, and three are not sufficiently well-preserved to securely identify.¹² Given that the west was under the rule of Valentinian, it is not surprising that the majority of statues here should have been dedicated to him; more striking is the fact that, of the five eastern statues, only one of them shows Valens, the other four being of Valentinian.¹³ The small number of surviving eastern statues means that it would be unwise to attach too much weight to this figure, since we cannot know how representative the selection is; nevertheless it is suggestive, and coheres well with the impression we get from other sources.

Overall, then, the impression given by imperial propaganda is one of unity and concord, but it is a unity and concord in which Valentinian was clearly the senior partner, and which might be summed up in Symmachus' phrase, "neither should the hope of the empire repose in a single man, nor yet should two produce the occasion for conflict."¹⁴ Now let us examine how the emperors governed and administered the empire, to see whether their propaganda is consistent with what we know of their government.

In administrative and legal affairs, it would seem that the message conveyed by imperial propaganda is broadly accurate. Although the two emperors never met in person after August 364,¹⁵ they seem to have shared many of the same concerns and preoccupations. Both emperors, for example, were very concerned to root out corruption in the imperial bureaucracy. Corruption was a major issue in late Roman government, and many laws were passed seeking to root it out, but Valens and Valentinian seem to have taken this further than usual, possibly because they themselves had fallen victims to corrupt officials before their rise to power.¹⁶ Ammianus, when discussing the emperors' characters, mentions a hatred of corruption as being a defining characteristic of both men: Valentinian, he tells us, was "cautious in bestowing high office, nor in his reign was any province governed by a money-lender or any office sold," whereas Valens is described as a "harsh and vigorous enemy of thieves and of those caught embezzling funds."¹⁷ Later authors, too, attest to their zeal in rooting out corruption; Zosimus, for example, writes that "if any of [their officials] was caught giving corrupt judgements, he was subject to punishment without mercy," and Malalas that "the most godlike Emperor Valentinian slew many senators and governors of provinces for corruption, theft, and extortion."¹⁸ This portrayal of the emperors' severity seems to have been justified, and multiple anecdotes have come down to us of the strict punishments the two brothers imposed. In the west, for example, Diocles, the *comes largitionum per Illyricum*, was burnt alive "for minor offences",¹⁹ and Malalas describes a similar fate overtaking the *praepositus* Rhodanus, who was burnt in the Hippodrome at Constantinople for defrauding a widow, as a result of which, the chronicler assures us, "great fear took hold of wrongdoers and those who seized others'

¹² "Last Statues of Antiquity (LSA)", <http://laststatues.classics.ox.ac.uk/> (30 January 2018).

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Sym. Or. 1.11.

¹⁵ Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 27.

¹⁶ Them. Or. 8.114a. See Ramsay MacMullen, *Corruption and the Decline of Rome* (Yale, 1998), esp. pp. 122-70, for a discussion of corruption in the late Roman government.

¹⁷ Amm. 30.9.3, 31.14.2.

¹⁸ Zos. 4.2.4; Mal. 13.31.

¹⁹ Am. 27.7.5.

property, and justice prevailed everywhere.”²⁰ On another occasion, Valens executed a *praepositus fabricae* for making a breastplate which weighed less than the stipulated amount, “a possible sign,” as Lenski says, “of embezzlement.”²¹ Even the imperial family was not exempt, and Valentinian’s first wife, Severa, was banished for using her position to obtain an estate at below the market value.²² These individual actions were backed up by general legislation, and laws survive from both halves of the empire forbidding a variety of corrupt practices.²³ The importance which these two emperors attached to stamping out corruption is indicated by the speed with which they set about their task: one of their earliest pieces of legislation, dating a mere two months after Valentinian’s accession, concerns the selection of local judges called *defensores civitatis*, ordering that they should be chosen from among imperial officials with no local connections or interests which might prejudice their judgements.²⁴

Thus it would appear that the two emperors did indeed share many of the same legislative concerns, suggesting that their propaganda’s emphasis on the unity of the imperial college contained a substantial element of truth. It also seems that the initiative for these laws often came from the west, again confirming the official portrayal of Valentinian as the senior emperor. The majority of laws from this period found in the *Theodosian Code* come from the west—two hundred and seventy-seven, as opposed to just sixty-two originating in the east—and this pattern continues even after Valentinian’s death: in the three years during which Valens and Gratian were joint rulers, there are forty-six laws known to have been passed by Gratian, compared to just fifteen which were first passed in the east.²⁵ Since, however, the *Code*’s compilation was biased towards the west—more specifically, towards Italy and Africa—any conclusion that the western emperors took the legislative initiative during this period would be unsound.²⁶ Anecdotal evidence, however, does suggest that Valentinian was the driving force behind many of these decrees. One law, for example, allowing bastards to inherit property, was passed in both halves of the empire, in spite of Valens’ reluctance to sanction the measure.²⁷ Another law, concerning the status of free-born women who cohabited with slaves, was issued in the western city of Trier, but addressed to Valens’ praetorian prefect Sallust.²⁸ Finally, another of Valentinian’s laws, concerning the regulation of education at Rome, also seems to have been enforced in the east: the law ordered misbehaving students to be flogged, a punishment which Libanius records as being applied in Antioch as well.²⁹

²⁰ Mal. 13.31.

²¹ Amm. 29.3.4; Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 274.

²² Mal. 13.31.

²³ From the west, *C. Th.* 1.16.9 (forbidding judges from hearing cases in their own homes), 12.6.7 (transferring responsibility for tax collection to governors’ staffs), 7.4.11 (ordering that tax collectors had to produce requisition forms before they could receive any supplies); from the east, 11.24.2 (forbidding farmers from bribing local garrison commanders to defend them against tax collectors).

²⁴ *C. Th.* 1.29.1. The date appended to the law itself is “v Kal. Mai. divo Joviano et Varroniano coss.”, i.e., April 27th, 364. Some modern historians have proposed re-dating the law to 368, although on unsound grounds; see Robert M. Frakes, *Contra Potentium Iniurias: The Defensor Civitatis and Late Roman Justice* (Munich, 2001), pp. 94-103, for a discussion.

²⁵ Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 266.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Lib. *Or.* 1.145; *C. Th.* 4.6.4.

²⁸ *C. Th.* 4.12.6; Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 268.

²⁹ Lib. *Or.* 1.169 f.; *C. Th.* 14.99.1.

There is, however, one exception to this picture of fraternal harmony, namely the emperors' approach to religious affairs. Both emperors seem to have adopted a broadly tolerant attitude towards pagan religious practices, but, whereas Valentinian generally showed a similar tolerance towards the various Christian sects, Valens was much more willing to impose doctrinal unity through force. With regards paganism, we know that Valentinian passed a law "by which each person was granted the ability to freely worship that which his soul has conceived"; although the law itself does not survive, it is referred to in a later statute concerning divination.³⁰ Ammianus confirms that Valentinian was known for his unwillingness to meddle in religious affairs, an impression reinforced by the pagan senator Symmachus, who later exhorted Valentinian's son and heir Valentinian II to follow his father's example and refrain from interfering with established religious custom.³¹ Although the emperors did reintroduce the pre-Julianic prohibition on animal sacrifices,³² such sacrifices had fallen into disfavour even among many pagans,³³ and it is not therefore clear that such a prohibition would have been perceived as particularly oppressive. Similarly, whilst the emperors were exceedingly zealous in prosecuting magic-users, launching a series of trials which, in both halves of the empire, rapidly degenerated into a reign of terror,³⁴ there is no reason to suppose that this was motivated by anti-pagan sentiment: the use of magic had been illegal in Rome since at least the late Republic, when the *Lex Cornelia* ordered convicted magicians to be burnt alive, and the Valentinianic persecutions saw the conviction of Christians as well as pagans.³⁵ These magic trials, then, were almost certainly motivated by fears of rebellion—one group of conspirators were supposed to have used magic to discover who would succeed Valens³⁶—rather than by anti-pagan sentiment.

Moreover, the emperors were willing to relax their laws for the benefit of respectable pagan cults; when, for example, the citizens of Achaëa complained that a new piece of legislation forbidding nocturnal sacrifices would make it impossible for them to celebrate their traditional mysteries, Valentinian agreed to relax the law in the case of well-established religious cults.³⁷ Here, too, we see evidence of imperial legislators working in concert: the relevant law in the *Codex Theodosianus* is addressed to the praetorian prefect of the Orient, Sallustius Secundus, which, combined with Zosimus' testimony, shows that the same law was applied in both halves of the empire.³⁸ It would seem, too, that both emperors followed the policy of relaxing the law for certain cults, since nocturnal mystery cults were openly celebrated in the eastern cities of Alexandria, Petra, and Elusa, no less than in Greece.³⁹

Thus it would seem that, regarding their attitude towards paganism, the emperors' policies were largely aligned; when we look at their attitudes towards Christianity, however, clear

³⁰ *C. Th.* 9.16.9.

³¹ *Amm.* 30.9.5; *Symm.* 3.19 f.

³² *Lib. Or.* 30.7.

³³ Scott Bradbury, "Julian's Pagan Revival and the Decline of Blood Sacrifice", *Phoenix*, 49/4 (1995), pp. 331-56.

³⁴ Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, pp. 218-34.

³⁵ Cf. *Paul. Sent.* 5.23.17 for the *Lex Cornelia*. Christian victims of the Valentinianic witch-hunt included the *notarius* Bassianus, and the consulars Eusebius and Hypatius (Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 228).

³⁶ *Amm.* 29.1.29-32.

³⁷ *Zos.* 4.3.2 f.

³⁸ *C. Th.* 9.16.7; Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 218.

³⁹ *Ep. Adv. Haer.* 51.22.9-11.

differences emerge. Despite having come from a majority-Arian province, Valentinian seems to have inclined towards Nicene Catholicism;⁴⁰ at any rate, he was content to allow the largely Catholic Church in his part of the empire a considerable degree of freedom. Thus, for example, he refused to interfere when the bishops of the Hellespontine region sought to hold a synod, on the grounds that, since he was a layman, such matters were beyond his competence, and he later permitted St. Ambrose to be appointed to the important see of Milan at the urging of local Christians, rather than trying to impose a candidate of his own choosing.⁴¹ After his death, the same St. Ambrose contrasted Valentinian's willingness to stay out of Church matters with his son and namesake's propensity for interference.⁴²

As for Valens, he initially followed his brother's *laissez-faire* policies, permitting prominent Catholic bishops, such as Athanasius of Alexandria, Vetrano of Tomi, and Basil of Caesarea, to remain in their sees, a decision which our sources claim was motivated by his desire to preserve peace in the eastern empire.⁴³ While a decree of 365 ordering those bishops who had been deposed under Constantius but permitted to return by Julian to once again vacate their sees would have fallen heaviest on the Catholics, the fact that Valens permitted prominent Catholics to retain their sees and made no other moves to persecute them suggests that this was mainly an attempt to restore the situation that had prevailed before Julian, rather than an attack on the emperor's theological opponents.⁴⁴

After around 373, however, Valens' policy changed from one of upholding the *status quo* to one of enforced unity. The reasons behind this change of policy are not entirely clear. Orosius blames the death of Valentinian, "the one man who could make him blush to commit an impious deed," although this seems unlikely, given that Valens' persecutions actually began two years before his brother's death.⁴⁵ A more probably catalyst is the trouble in Alexandria following Athanasius' death in 373: Valens sought to use the opportunity to install an Arian as Patriarch, but when the people of the city preferred to follow the Catholic Peter instead, the emperor had to send it a detachment of soldiers to enforce his choice.⁴⁶ Whether because this recourse to open force had broken down a psychological barrier or for some other reason, Valens then began a more widespread persecution, ordering the Catholic communities of many Syrian towns to be expelled from their churches and their bishops sent into exile.⁴⁷ Monastics were, apparently, a particular target of Valens' ire: although Valens had apparently tried to draft monks into his army as early as 365, as his persecutions intensified he found forced conscription a useful tool, and a number of sources record monastics being drafted into the

⁴⁰ So Soz. 6.6, 12, 21; Socr. 4.1; Theod. 4.5, 7. Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, pp. 241 f., claims that these writers are mistaken, on the grounds that Illyricum was a largely Arian region and it is unlikely that someone with such a background would embrace Trinitarianism; but this is a weak reason for laying aside the unanimous testimony of the primary sources.

⁴¹ Soz. 6.7.2; Theod. 4.6.

⁴² Ambr. *Ep.* 21.5.

⁴³ On Athanasius of Alexandria, see *Ep. Adv. Haer.* 68.11, Soz. 6.12, Socr. 4.13; on Vetrano of Tomi, Soz. 6.21; on Basil of Caesarea, *Greg. Naz. Or.* 43.44-51, *Greg. Nys. Eun.* 1.12, Soz. 6.16, Theod. 4.16.

⁴⁴ Soz. 6.12.

⁴⁵ Oros. 7.33.1; Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 260.

⁴⁶ Theod. 4.17-19.

⁴⁷ See Theod. 4.13 ff. for an account of these persecutions, and Bas. *Ep.* 221, 222, for a contemporary view. The later pilgrim Egeria reports meeting several confessors of these persecutions during her pilgrimage to the Holy Land (*Eg. It.* 19.1-5).

imperial service, especially the army or the mines.⁴⁸ So great was Valens' persecution that he even drew the disapproval of the pagan Themistius, who advised him in one of his orations that "God wishes to be worshipped in different ways, so that each man pays greater reverence to his majesty due to the difficulty of knowing him."⁴⁹

Part of the difference between Valens' and Valentinian's policies may be explained by the different religious circumstances of their dominions: the Church in the west was, outside the Illyrian provinces, solidly Nicene and Trinitarian in its doctrine, whereas the east was divided between Catholic Trinitarianism and various shades of Arianism. Ultimately we cannot know how Valens would have acted had the east been more uniform, nor Valentinian if he had been faced with more doctrinal controversy. As it stands, however, the differing treatment of religion does reflect a major difference between the two brothers' policies, and Socrates Scholasticus accurately summarises the situation when he tells us that "regarding the management of public affairs they were of one mind, but regarding Christianity... they differed."⁵⁰

Moving from domestic to foreign and military policy, the impression we get is one of distant good-will rather than close co-operation. The first major military test for the new emperors came in late 365, when Procopius, a minor member of the Constantinian dynasty, incited a rebellion in Constantinople. Troops sent by Valens to suppress the revolt instead defected to Procopius' side, and it rapidly became clear that the rebellion posed a major threat to Valens' régime.⁵¹ Valentinian nevertheless took no steps to help his brother: he was currently busy fighting the Alamanni, and is supposed to have defended his decision by saying that Procopius was merely a private enemy of his brother and himself, whereas the Alamanni were foes to the entire Roman world.⁵² Probably his real motives owed more to fears that, if the emperor seemed to be abandoning Gaul to the Alamanni, the locals would be tempted to support a usurper of their own, a threat which doubtless loomed especially large in Valentinian's mind because the Gallic army was unusually prone to back pretenders.⁵³ It is impossible to say for certain whether or not Valentinian's decision was the correct one, but either way it indicates the limits on co-operation even in an imperial college as tightly knit as that of Valens and Valentinian. When the situation became difficult, any emperor would almost always prioritise his own survival over that of his colleagues.

For the rest of their joint reigns, it would seem that Valentinian was chiefly responsible for determining the overall drift of the empire's foreign policy. Valens began his first Gothic war only after obtaining his brother's consent—indeed, the war itself may have been incited by Valentinian, who seems to have been particularly preoccupied by the barbarian menace.⁵⁴ Malalas goes even further, suggesting that Valens was sent to command in the Persian war as a mere representative of his brother.⁵⁵ After signing a truce with Persia in 371, Valens sent

⁴⁸ Ep. Adv. Haer. 80.2.3 f.; Jer. Chron. a. 375; Ruf. Hist. Eccl. 11.6; C. Th. 12.1.63.

⁴⁹ The speech itself is no longer extant, although it is referred to in Socr. 4.32, whence comes this quotation.

⁵⁰ Socr. 4.1.

⁵¹ Amm. 26.6-8.

⁵² Amm. 26.5.13, Sym. Or. 1.19.

⁵³ Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 76; Joachim Szidat, "Gaul and the Roman Emperors of the Fourth Century", in Johannes Wienand (ed.), *Contested Monarchy: Integrating the Roman Empire in the Fourth Century A.D.* (Oxford, 2015), pp. 119-133.

⁵⁴ Amm. 27.4.1; Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, pp. 142 f.; cf. Amm. 30.8.12, Sym. Or. 2.17.

⁵⁵ Mal. 13.30.

sixteen regiments from his field army west to help Valentinian with his wars against the Germans—“Here again, we have intimations of coordination and cooperation between the brother emperors.”⁵⁶ Despite such incidents, however, distance and the slowness of communications meant that any military co-operation could never be particularly close, and whilst the broad outlines of foreign policy seem to have been the same for both emperors, they had to implement their policy virtually independently.

On the whole, then, the reigns of Valens and Valentinian were marked by co-operation: close in the sphere of legislative activity, and necessarily more distant but nonetheless real in foreign policy. This cosy relationship between east and west, however, started to break down after Valentinian’s death in 375, when his sixteen-year-old son Gratian, who had officially been raised to the rank of Augustus in 367, gained *de facto* as well as *de jure* authority over his father’s lands. For his part, Valens proved far less willing to accept subordination to a teenage boy than he had to his elder brother, and whereas previously his propaganda had been content to acknowledge his inferior rôle, it now began to take a more bullishly superior tone. An inscription from the Chersonese exemplifies Valens’ conception of the proper hierarchy: Valens himself is described as “the brother of Valentinian, greatest in all things”, making clear his brother’s superiority, but Gratian is relegated to the rank of “nephew of Valens”.⁵⁷ Valens may also have refused to print coins with western—that is, Gratian-dictated—designs, implicitly refusing to accept his younger brother’s superiority.⁵⁸ A similar message was given out by Valens’ own coinage, which showed the eastern emperor bearing the title *Maximus Augustus* and towering over his two younger colleagues (Valentinian’s son, Valentinian II, had been proclaimed Augustus on his father’s death, although since his was only four at the time his territory was actually administered by Gratian).⁵⁹ As for Gratian, he seems to have fully reciprocated his uncle’s animosity, at least if Lenski is correct in arguing that he deliberately dragged his feet in coming to aid Valens against the Gothic invasion.⁶⁰ Whilst we cannot be certain what would have happened had Valens survived past 378, the evidence suggests a period of increasing coolness in relations, perhaps even resulting in a civil war.

To sum up, the joint rule of Valens and Valentinian is indeed an example of a successful and harmonious imperial college, and the impression given by official propaganda on this score is substantially correct. Such an example of a successful college had not been seen since the days of Constantine, and arguably would not be seen again after Valentinian’s death. Like the earlier colleges of Diocletian and of Constantine, Valens and Valentinian were able to work together because one of them was unquestionably superior; when Valentinian died, however, tension arose between the surviving emperors, until Valens’ death at Adrianople resolved the situation. The joint reign of Valens and Valentinian thus provides an example of late imperial government operating at its best, whereas Valens and Gratian’s inability to maintain harmony points to one of the late empire’s main weaknesses: the success of any imperial college owed more to its members’ personal willingness to accept a superior, rather than to any stable, institutional factors.

⁵⁶ Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, pp. 311 f.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

⁵⁸ J.W.E. Pearce, *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, vol. ix: *Valentinian I-Theodosius I* (London, 1951), pp 264 f.

⁵⁹ Lenski, *Failure of Empire*, p. 358.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 365-7.

Abbreviations used for primary sources

Ambr. *Ep.*: Ambrose of Milan, *Epistles*
Amm.: Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res Gestae*
Aus. *Vers. Pasch.*: Ausonius, *Versus Paschales*
Bas. *Ep.*: Basil of Caesarea, *Epistles*
C. *Th.*: *Codex Theodosianus*
Eg. *It.*: Egeria, *Itinerarium Egeriae*
Ep. *Adv. Haer.*: Epiphanius, *Adversus Haereses*
Greg. *Naz. Or.*: Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes*
Greg. *Nys. Eun.*: Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium*
Jord. *Get.*: Jordanes, *Getica*
Jer. *Chron.*: Jerome, *Chronicle*
Mal.: John Malalas, *Chronicle*
Lib. *Or.*: Libanius, *Orationes*
Oros.: Orosius, *Historiae Adversus Paganos*
Paul. *Sent.*: Paulus, *Sentences*
Phil.: Philostorgius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*
Ruf. *Hist. Eccl.*: Rufinus, *Historia Ecclesiastica*
Socr.: Socrates Scholasticus, *Historia Ecclesiastica*
Soz.: Sozomen, *Historia Ecclesiastica*
Symm. *Or.*: Symmachus, *Orationes*
Them. *Or.*: Themistius, *Orationes*
Theod. *Hist. Eccl.*: Theodoret, *Historia Ecclesiastica*
Zos.: Zosimus, *Historia Nea*

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